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IT'S CONFLICT ALL THE WAY DOWN
Richard Michael Fischl*
Ever since a colleague at the National Labor Relations Board
caught me pulling a Harvard Law School Yearbook out of my
backpack ("Wake up feeling a little insecure this morning?" she
asked wryly. "Does toting that around help?"), I have been
careful to keep law school artifacts from prying eyes. In fact, my
reasons for carrying the yearbook were less revealing, or at least
revealing in a different way, than my colleague had assumed. In
those days, just like these days, I biked to the office, and in those
days, just like these days, I carried work back and forth in a
backpack. But in those days, unlike these days, the materials I
carried frequently included official documents, so I needed a way
to protect them from sweat and mutilation during the long journey
through Rock Creek Park-a task perfectly suited for the only
oversized, hardcover coffee-table-style book I owned in those far
more Spartan times.
Chastened by that exchange and similar ones over the years, I
have taken to keeping the yearbook and various incoming scuds-
Harvard Magazine, the Harvard Law Record, fundraising letters,
etc.-far away from the office, and I don't leave them lying around
in the more public areas of my home either. They do make for
amusing reading-whether or not I am feeling insecure-so I've
settled for keeping such materials on my bed stand, the place
reserved for even more embarrassing things in an earlier stage of
life.
And so it was that one afternoon several years ago my wife
entered our bedroom and found my then ten-year-old step-
daughter thumbing through a magazine on the bed stand. Pam
was about to ask Blair what she was doing when Blair suddenly
dropped the magazine and cried, "What's that??!!!" Assuming
that her daughter had just encountered a dead palmetto bug
pressed between the pages-a not uncommon experience here in
South Florida-Pam carefully retrieved what turned out to be the
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. Many thanks to Jane Baron, Peter
Goodrich, Pat Gudridge, Duncan Kennedy, Jeremy Paul, Tamara Piety, Kerry Rittich,
and Pierre Schlag for their thoughtful reactions to an earlier draft.
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Fall 1996 issue of the law school alumni magazine, the Harvard
Law Bulletin. The source of Blair's fright was not a bug at all, but
was instead Duncan Kennedy, whose picture appeared in a
collection featuring a number of professors who had just been
honored with named chairs. The picture-and its stark contrast to
those of the other honorees-is pointedly described in Peter
Goodrich's Essay,' and no doubt it was the dark glasses, heavy
boots, and black leather jacket that prompted Blair's startled
response. "Oh, that's just Michael's favorite teacher from law
school," Pam reassured her. Blair's reply (and for full effect you
have to picture the exaggerated roll of the eyes and the look of
utter disdain that accompanied it): "Well, that figures."
Doesn't it, though? In point of fact, some twenty years earlier
I had encountered a similarly striking contrast when Duncan
taught Contracts to my first-year section. While our other
professors set a decidedly sober and professional tone by wearing
jackets and ties (and, in one case, a snazzy-looking three-piece
suit), Duncan sported a black turtleneck, a tattered-at-the-elbows
ice-pink sweater, and shoulder-length hair, and he lounged
comfortably atop the desk as we entered his classroom for the first
time. I can still recall the monumental sense of relief at his
announcement that we were free to "pass" when called on, and the
amazement I felt when he stated that his only rule was that you
weren't allowed to raise your hand while another student was
talking-a salutary effort to counter a socially insidious practice
that our other, more appropriately attired professors were already
encouraging, albeit with varying degrees of malice.
In any event, the point of the opening story is that (as usual)
Pam and Blair had it right on the money: Duncan was my "favorite
teacher," and "that figures." But for me it figures less because of
the considerable comfort I felt in his classroom than because of the
comfort I felt during a half decade of law practice, for which (the
conventional wisdom about the utility of legal theory in general
and critical legal studies ("cls") in particular to the contrary
notwithstanding) I found myself exceptionally well-prepared,
thanks almost exclusively to Duncan. In a nutshell, his Contracts
course taught us that there were recurring patterns in legal
argument-patterns of rules, reasons, purposes, and policies and
(more to the point) of counterrules, -reasons, -purposes, and
-policies-that bore a complex but fascinating relationship with
structures of ideological conflict within American Liberalism.
Indeed, at the time he was in the midst of writing one of the
I See Peter Goodrich, Duncan Kennedy as I Imagine Him: The Man, the Work, His
Scholarship, and the Polity, 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 971, 973-74 (2001).
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original critical legal studies, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication,2 and so it is no surprise that structures of conflict-
most famously, individualism vs. altruism-were as much a part of
the classroom show as the rhetorical thrust and parry.
Which brings the story back to the National Labor Relations
Board, where I did appellate work between law school and
teaching. The Board is the administrative agency that prosecutes
unfair labor practices-chasing down employers who fire
employees for union organizing and unions who persecute
dissidents-and my job was to draft briefs and present oral
arguments on the Board's behalf in federal courts of appeals
around the country. (As Pierre Schlag might put it, it was moot
court for life;3 but it was moot court with wings and a per diem.)
This was obviously the perfect testing ground for the
deployment of Duncan's argumentative strategies and techniques.
To be sure, I thought about my other law school professors from
time to time, though mostly when a crabby appellate court judge
acted like one of them during oral argument. (Relax, I would
think to myself. He's not your father, and he's not even Arthur
Miller. And besides: You actually understand the case this time.)
But-as a classmate who was clerking for a judge on the Seventh
Circuit put it during our second year out of school-the lessons we
learned from Duncan about argument construction we used in our
real-world jobs every single day.
The concept of "indeterminacy" was more implicit than
explicit in Duncan's teaching in 1975. One certainly came away
from his classes with a strong sense of play in the elaborate
rhetorical structures he would dash across the blackboard, but I
don't remember ever hearing him (or anyone else, for that matter)
actually use the word while I was in law school, and I certainly
don't remember him making global "anything goes"
pronouncements of the sort regularly attributed to cls only a short
time later. Duncan was taking doctrine seriously-so seriously
that it is only a slight exaggeration to say that he spent more time
analyzing its nooks and crannies than did the rest of my mostly
mainstream law school professors put together.
Truth be told, the notion that "legal rules don't decide cases"
was something I always thought I figured out on my own, not in
law school but while I was in practice. It is something that most
2 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance].
3 See Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2053 (1993).
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labor lawyers are likely to figure out sooner or later. The
experience of handling several dozen appellate cases persuaded
me that the traditional legal materials-statutory text and purpose,
legislative history, interpretive precedent, etc.-were only part of
the story, and sometimes a very small part.
For one thing, there was always the make-up of your panel of
judges. Well-crafted arguments could rally labor's friends,
frequently persuade the moderates, and even occasionally win
grudging assent from hard-core opponents. But no matter how
strong your case and how seemingly persuasive your arguments, if
you drew the wrong panel-and even then every circuit had its
share of judges openly hostile to labor's cause-you (and, more to
the point, the employees whose interests you were representing)
were unlikely to eke out a victory.
There were times, moreover, when your persuasive talents
didn't seem to be of much help even among friends. After a
couple of years of practice, I began to suspect the existence of a
"hidden topography" in labor law-a set of understandings
unarticulated but seemingly widely shared among judges and
lawyers of all stripes.
Sometimes the understandings created a "free space" in which
the usual argumentative work of appellate advocacy was simply
unnecessary, enabling the brief- or opinion-writer to make what
seemed to me to be breathtakingly tendentious points without
offering the slightest support from either the record or the legal
materials. Quickly to mind comes the short and authority-free
passage at the crucial analytical point in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Daniel,' the unanimous Supreme Court opinion
concluding, remarkably enough, that employee pension plans
aren't "investments" (and accordingly aren't covered by the
antifraud provisions of federal securities law), and drafted by no
less a giant of the craft than the late Justice Lewis Powell:
Only in the most abstract sense may it be said that an employee
"exchanges" some portion of his labor in return for
[participation in a pension plan].... He surrenders his labor as
a whole, and in return receives a compensation package that is
substantially devoid of aspects resembling a security. His
decision to accept and retain covered employment may have
only an attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived investment
possibilities of a future pension. Looking at the economic
realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling his labor
primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment.'
4 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
5 Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 22:773
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Other times the tacit understandings had the opposite effect-
telling you what you couldn't argue, rather than what you didn't
have to prove, and forcing you to defend employees in
condescending rather than straightforward and unapologetic
terms. In challenging the dismissal of strikers for their efforts to
prevent replacement workers from crossing a picket line, for
example, you were supposed to argue that emotions run high in
the strike setting and that working folks just can't help but
succumb to an occasional "moment of animal exuberance."6 But
you couldn't argue that they ought not to suffer discharge for
trying to protect their jobs in much the same way that most of us
would try to protect our homes and families against a similarly
threatening invasion. After all, the jobs weren't "their" jobs-just
as all their work wasn't an "investment."
Thus it was that you frequently found yourself forced to fight
on enemy terrain, and although you could still pull off some
surprising victories now and then-hidden topography didn't
"determine" individual outcomes any more than legal rules did-it
was an uphill battle all the way. And the hill, of course, was
capitalism.
By 1983, President Reagan had appointed a majority of the
five-member Labor Board, and so it was time for me to get outta
Dodge before I had to begin defending their handiwork in court.
Imagine my delight when I discovered that Duncan and his fellow
travelers had in the meantime become a full-fledged academic
"conference"-with annual meetings and a summer camp and an
emerging Canon and even an underground paper. (My first
publication as a law professor, I am proud to say, was in The
Lizard.) And imagine my further delight when I discovered that
the lessons I had learned in legal practice turned out to have an
important place in cls lingo: "indeterminacy" (cases can come out
either way); "law is politics" (adjudication is a profoundly
ideological activity); and "tilt" (that hidden hill is capitalism, and
it's bigger than the both of us).
So imagine my dismay when I found out that you really
weren't supposed to believe in all three of those ideas at the same
time. Although the view that "law is politics" was widely accepted
among "the crits"-in retrospect no doubt largely as a result of the
fact that it meant different things to different people-the
6 Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
293 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.).
2001]
CARDOZO LAWREVIEW
movement with which I was enthusiastically plighting my troth was
divided over the supposed tension between "indeterminacy" (cases
can come out either way) and "tilt" (oh no they can't)-a tension,
I confess, that had escaped me when I thought I was experiencing
both of those phenomena, intensely, in practice. But depending on
your point of view, one of those notions represented the true left
and the other was either vulgar Marxist residue or just plain
irresponsible.
To their credit, in a way, my most senior colleagues at the
University of Miami saw no conflict at all between
"indeterminacy" and "tilt"; less to their credit, they were perfectly
happy to try to get me fired for espousing either of them-and
most of all for advocating the view that "law is politics." Duncan
thus finds himself in odd company, for in the book that brings us
together for this symposium,7 he focuses his critical fire on each of
these ideas, and neither they nor critical jurisprudence will ever be
the same.
Indeterminacy. Leave it to Duncan to discover a "loopified"
field in the clash between the partisans of radical indeterminacy
and the rule-of-law squad-to carve out not, so much a middle
position as a position that manages to outflank the extremes:
Sometimes the judge is bound by the legal materials; sometimes
she's not; but when she thinks she's bound, she never knows
whether she's correct in that view or merely inadequate to the task
of ferreting out a persuasive argument for a different result.
Law is politics. Here Duncan picks up where he left off with
his 1985 critical phenomenology of judging,8 and the basic pitch is
this: If you want to understand the politics of American law, the
best place to start is inside the judge's head as she struggles with
the legal materials to achieve results in individual cases. But the
struggle Duncan depicts bears precious little resemblance to the
conventional image of the judge torn between her political agenda
and the obligations of faithful law application.
For one thing, in Duncan's account "politics" isn't just
something that the judge brings to legal decision making from the
outside; instead, a large dose of politics is already there when she
arrives. Thus, the legal materials with which the judge is bound to
work are saturated with "policy" arguments of the sort that no
self-respecting and even remotely sophisticated post-Realist
7 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIICLE (1997)
[hereinafter CRITIQUE].
8 See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986) [hereinafter Kennedy, Freedom and
Constraint].
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lawyer would leave home without. And "policy" arguments-
which in effect bridge the gap between straightforward appeals to
established authority (rules, precedents, etc.) and naked, extralegal
appeals to politics-are the "Trojan horse" of ideology in
American law, enabling the judge who invokes them to "deplo[y]
the full range of 'social values' that are conventionally understood
to be relevant to choices among norms" and thus ostensibly
forbidden grounds for adjudication.'
Duncan's account of the judge who is working with these very
political materials is likewise at odds with the conventional view;
indeed, tracking his take on indeterminacy, Duncan's analysis here
once again outflanks the extremes in the traditional debate. On
the one hand, that bogeyman of mainstream jurisprudence-the
activist ideologue tempted to enact her politics into law-will more
than occasionally find herself bound by the legal materials to reach
a result with which she disagrees, perhaps strongly. The much
maligned "rogue judge"-in Duncan's account, a liberal or
conservative "constrained activist"-doesn't roam at large after
all.
On the other hand, the very judges conventionally assumed to
be the least political turn out to be far more ideologically attuned
than anyone before has suggested. Duncan identifies these folks
as "difference-splitters" (who endeavor to locate a compromise
between the respective claims of their liberal and conservative
activist colleagues) 10 and "bi-polar" judges (who side sometimes
with one group and sometimes with the other, in order to maintain
a posture of independence)," and in his account it is clear that
both types are negotiating the terrain of ideology, albeit following
maps drawn by others.
What's more, where the rogue-judge thesis is typically
understood to predict that ideological judges will push the law to
the political extremes (Lochner" to the right and Roe v. Wade 3 to
the left), Duncan's take is that a principal effect of ideological
adjudication in the American context is a moderating one:
Legislation and common-law doctrine-however liberal or
conservative in inception-tend to "regress to the mean" under
the accumulated effect of judicial interpretation. All concerned
are in deep "denial" about the politics of law, and elite partisans
from both camps perpetuate the myth of apolitical judging in order
9 CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 110.
10 See id. at 184-85.
11 See id. at 185-86.
12 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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to keep their "moderating" powder dry in the event that the other
side is ever able to capture the legislative branch and enact its
worst vices into law.
Tilt. If Duncan finds the legal materials to be too constraining
to be indeterminate, he finds "tilt" to be too indeterminate to be
constraining. But this isn't your grandfather's relative autonomy;
for Duncan, the search for "what's really going on" beneath the
rhetorical thrust and parry-it's not law, it's politics; it's not
politics, it's breakfast; it's not breakfast, it's Liberalism; it's not
Liberalism, it's culture-is as fruitless in its own way as the efforts
of mainstream legal theorists to put Humpty-Dumpty back
together again (and again and again) after the Realist critique of
formalism. Watch his dust:
Within the opposing sides in the legal argument there are
opposing sides in an ideological argument, and within them
antagonistic character types and within them opposed cultural
styles and within them... opposed modes of legal discourse.
There is a circle or an infinite regress, in which there is never a
determining outside discourse or fact but a series of never final
unveilings. 4
It is, in other words, conflict all the way down.
Duncan thus reduces the tension between the seemingly
incompatible claims of "indeterminacy" and "tilt" by offering a
more modest version of each than the positions historically
attributed to cls. And while his account portrays politics as an
utterly pervasive force in law-residing not only in the motives of
judicial activists but also prominently in the calculations of
supposed moderates and indeed even in the rhetorical structures
of the law itself-the politics at stake are far more modest than a
generation of cls has assumed. For on this account, the ideological
dimension of adjudication comes down to the familiar American
conflict between political liberals and conservatives-not the
politics of what Duncan refers to as big-L Liberalism, the larger
(big-I) Ideology within which the endless debates between liberals
and conservatives serve mostly to distract us from the many issues
that are not debated at all.
All that modesty gets Duncan into trouble in this crowd. Jane
Baron wonders whether Duncan is moderating his claims in order
to sell them but worries that in so doing he is selling them short.15
14 CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 289.
15 See Jane B. Baron, The Undersell: An Essay on Duncan Kennedy's A Critique of
Adjudication, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 797 (2001).
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Similarly, Tamara Piety suggests that Duncan would rather be
right about modest claims than run the risk of being wrong about
important ones and notes the irony of that stance, given Duncan's
relentless rejection of "rightness in all its forms." 6  Joanne
Conaghan takes issue with Duncan's modest account of ideology
because "[i]t tells us nothing about the role judges play in
reproducing what is generally perceived to be nonideological" and
thus "neglect[s] the role of adjudication in reproducing and
reinforcing what is politically taken for granted."17  Striking a
similar note, Steve Winter critiques a failure to recognize that "law
is always ideological in the sense that it enforces (and reinforces)
the dominant normative views of the culture" and that "the
ideological dimension of law is most pronounced precisely when
judges are.., unaware of the normative entailments of the
conceptual materials with which they work.""
As I read the book, Duncan's embrace of self-professedly
"chastened" views is not the product of some midlife moderation
crisis but rather the result of his long-standing fascination with the
moment of choice in judicial reasoning. (Critical Legal Sartre
indeed.19) Some of our most cherished cultural myths to the
contrary notwithstanding-"we are a government of laws, not
men";2 judges should follow the law, not make it-judges make
choices all of the time. They choose between rules (e.g.,
contributory vs. comparative negligence); they choose between
interpretations (e.g., broad vs. narrow readings of a statute or a
precedent); and-when the law's commands seem to conflict with
their notion of a just outcome-they choose between giving in and
pressing on in search of a plausible argument to the contrary.
What is extraordinary about A Critique of Adjudication-and what
is extraordinary about Duncan's earlier work on the
phenomenology of adjudication 21-is how well it captures the
strategic dimension of this moment of choice.
I was an appellate lawyer, not a judge (nor even a clerk to
one), so I cannot confirm the accuracy of Duncan's account from a
judge's perspective; indeed, a pair of local judges who attended a
16 Tamara R. Piety, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Si&Ie: Confession Without
Avoidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 952 (2001).
17 Joanne Conaghan, Wishful Thinking or Bad Faith: A Feminist Encounter with
Duncan Kennedy's Critique of Adjudication, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 721, 732 (2001).
18 Steven L. Winter, The Next Century of Legal Thought?, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 747,
772 (2001).
19 See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1627, 1679 (1991).
20 The sources of that famous adage can be found in Frank I. Michelman, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 n.2 (1986).
21 See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 8.
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faculty seminar that Duncan gave here in Miami several years
back expressed nothing but skepticism about the portrait he drew
of their work, and my colleague Pat Gudridge reported a similar
reaction when he gave a lecture on Duncan's book to a conference
of state court judges from across the country. Yet as Duncan's
analysis suggests, it is possible that the principal difference
between my perspective and theirs is born of the fact that-unlike
judges-appellate lawyers have no need to be in denial about the
strategic dimension of their legal work. And the experience of
doing that work, at least at this time and in this legal culture, is an
experience of relative (i.e., moderate) indeterminacy, huge and
frequent doses of liberal vs. conservative (i.e., moderate) politics,
and only an occasional glimpse of tilt.
But all perspectives are partial, and in order to focus like a
laser beam on the phenomenology of choice, Duncan pays scant
attention to what he refers to as "unselfconscious rule-
following"-i.e., decision making that doesn't seem to the judge
to involve any choice at all. I think this led him to understate the
ideological dimension of American adjudication in at least two
important respects. Thus, I agree with Conaghan and Winter that
ideology plays every bit as lively and important a role in the
construction of what judges simply take for granted-what I
described earlier as the law's "hidden topography"-as it does in
the conscious-but-denied judicial strategizing that Duncan so
astutely explores. At the same time, my sense is that a lot of what
passes for "unselfconscious rule-following" isn't nearly as
unselfconscious or as constrained as Duncan's account suggests.
The decision to relegate to the sidelines a large body of work
mapping political terrain that most judges and other participants in
the legal system don't experience as political at all-in other
words, to bracket "tilt"-is a bit surprising in a book that explores
the role of ideology in law, and, major fan though I am, Duncan
will have to say more than he has thus far to persuade me
otherwise. It won't do to suggest that the taken-for-granted is
"worth study" as a product of "authoritative discourse in general"
but not in connection with "the specific institutional practice of
adjudication." 3 The premise is clearly right: The Supreme Court
Justice who concludes that "an employee is selling his labor
primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment""4 -like
the judge who observes that "in every employment ladder from
the lowliest to the highest, there will come a stage at which a
22 CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 160.
23 Id. at 405 n. 21.
24 Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
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woman who has family responsibilities must make a choice"; 25 and
the jury foreman who, upon hearing an eloquent closing by an
African-American lawyer, exclaims "[t]hat Nigger was good!" and
proceeds in the face of both law and evidence to the contrary to
vote for the conviction of the African-American defendant 26--is
revealing assumptions about class (or gender or race) that are no
doubt as widely shared outside of the legal community as within it.
But it doesn't follow from the fact that he may be doing so
unwittingly that either the performance or its effects should be of
less interest to scholars exploring the ideological dimension of law
qua law. Indeed, Duncan's own account repeatedly stresses the
fact that judges are working with politically saturated materials
and disposing of important stakes in politically contested terrain,
conditions that are certainly met whether a judge is operating self-
consciously, unselfconsciously, or somewhere in between.
To be sure, Duncan does not altogether dismiss the role of
class-, gender-, and race-based assumptions in "influencing"
judicial decisions.27  His aim seems rather to be to put such
considerations in their place and to reject the suggestion that they
in any meaningful way "determine" legal outcomes. It is the left
legacy of dividing the social world into base and superstructure-
where law is understood as simply a means of facilitating and
legitimating the "logic" of capitalism (or of patriarchy or of racial
supremacy)-that is Duncan's principal target:
Although "outside" factors influence adjudication, they do not
impose on it an outside "logic." The first reason for this is...
that they do not determine the rules judges make, in any
ordinary sense of the word "determine." The second reason
is... that neither the economic base nor patriarchy nor racial
supremacy has any more internal coherence, any more "logic,"
than the process of legal reasoning from the extant materials.28
Fair enough, but the analogy-"outside" factors don't
"determine" legal decisions any more than "legal materials" do-
is somewhat surprising. The point of Duncan's careful and
extremely nuanced account of "the process of legal reasoning from
the extant materials" is that those materials exert a great deal
more constraint on judicial decisions than proponents of "radical
indeterminacy" have argued; the inference in the quoted passage is
that they afford little constraint at all. What is missing is the
25 Joanne Conaghan, The Family-Friendly Workplace in Labour Law Discourse: Some
Reflections on London Underground v. Edwards, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION 161, 161 (H. Collins et al. eds., 2000) (citation omitted).
26 Winter, supra note 18, at 760.
27 See CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 405 n.21.
28 Id. at 289.
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suggestion of a middle term-something between "anything goes"
and "determinism," an account of the relationship between
adjudication and "the dominant normative views of the culture 29
that is as careful and nuanced as Duncan's account of legal
reasoning itself.
But here's what we get instead:
[G]iving up on the idea of a base whose structure determines
legal rules does not mean giving up on establishing a connection
between legal rules and their social, economic and political
context. When we find that the discourse of legal justification is
internally contradictory in ways that sometimes render it plastic,
open to ideologically oriented legal work, we try to increase our
understanding by "going deeper[,]" ... by appealing to
ideology, in the vulgar sense of liberalism and conservatism.3"
"Liberalism and conservatism"? As my then three-year-old
nephew so memorably exclaimed-he was reacting to the scene in
Disney's Beauty and the Beast when Belle suddenly finds herself
surrounded by the same wolf pack that had menaced her father
earlier in the movie-"Oh, no! Not those guys again!" A principal
point of a generation of critical work is that the debates between
(small-l) liberalism and conservatism occur within a larger
conceptual paradigm-big-L Liberalism, if you will-in which the
assumptions of capitalism, patriarchy, and racial supremacy go
largely unnoticed and in any event unquestioned. And while
Duncan has offered a fresh and vibrant account of the role "those
guys" play in adjudication, that account is only part of the story of
the politics of American law.
It is a different aspect of Duncan's argument about rule-
following-his effort to distinguish cases involving either a choice
between rules or a choice between interpretations of a rule (on the
one hand) from cases involving a "mere" application of a
preselected, preinterpreted rule to the facts (on the other)-that
I'd like to explore for the remainder of this Essay. In
"unselfconscious rule-following," he argues:
[T]he judge has facts before her and a single rule in mind. She
is focused on the question of what happened, and there are two
well-defined contradictory answers. If one version is what
"really" happened, then it seems obvious that defendant has
29 Winter, supra note 18, at 772.
30 CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 289.
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violated the relevant rule; if the other, then the defendant has
not violated the rule.3'
"Where application means fact finding in this straightforward
way," he explains at another point, "application will have
ideological significance only where the intelligentsias anticipate
that fact finding is a matter of choice, in the sense of being open to
ideological 'bias."' 32
The burden of my argument is that rule application is far
more problematic-and that so-called fact finding is "a matter of
choice" far more often-than Duncan suggests in these passages
and at a number of other points in the book.33 Indeed, I think it's
possible to map the terrain of recurring factual arguments and
counterarguments, and the relationship of those arguments to
ideological conflict, in the same way that Duncan and others have
outlined the "crystalline structure" of so much of the rest of legal
reasoning.34
I begin with a caveat about the sketch that follows: I am doing
some "bracketing" of my own, for I don't deal here with the
credibility dimension of fact finding, where judges and other legal
decision makers decide whether to believe the cop or the accused
(or the man vs. the woman; the landlord vs. the tenant; the
employer vs. the employee) when the parties and their witnesses
31 Id. at 160.
32 Id. at 61.
33 See id. at 32 (suggesting that "problematic cases of rule application" though
"common" are the exception rather than the rule in American adjudication); id. at 60
("[W]e can usually apply [rules] ourselves in ways that we anticipate will correspond
exactly to the way others will apply them .... ); id. at 276-77 (arguing that "we can and
sometimes do formulate rules to minimize the need for value judgments in applying them
to facts" and that "language can often be made concrete enough so that disagreements will
be rare").
34 The seminal piece in this genre is, of course, Duncan's Form and Substance, supra
note 2, and his subsequent work-particularly Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal
Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991) [hereinafter Kennedy, Semiotics], and
chapters 3, 5, and 6 of Critique-has elaborated and refined it considerably; the
"crystalline structure" reference is to Jack Balkin's The Crystalline Structure of Legal
Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986). Jeremy Paul and I attempt to compile a partial
bibliography of this "semiotic" scholarship---a term I use with some trepidation after
reading Goodrich, supra note 1, at 976-in our recent book, Getting to Maybe. See
RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON
LAW SCHOOL EXAMS 323-25 (1999) [hereinafter FISCHL & PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE]
(listing works by Duncan and Jack Balkin, as well as by Jamie Boyle, Jennifer Jaff, and
Mark Kelman, among others). Although it doubles as a how-to guide for students facing
the challenges of law exams, the book is also an extended meditation on legal reasoning
and argument construction, and it represents what we hope will be viewed as a
contribution to this body of scholarship. The "exam" focus was designed to get students to
actually read it and to provide a context for concrete demonstrations of the recurring
patterns in legal argument. The analysis that follows is a first effort to theorize the
rhetorical structures we identify in chapter 6 of the book ("Forks in the Facts"); it is also
the groundwork for a larger work-in-progress, tentatively entitled The Politics of Facts.
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offer conflicting accounts of an event. There is, to be sure, a
complex politics to this sort of fact finding-as a colleague with a
lot of jury trial experience once put it, a witness can frequently
accomplish more by giving his name, address, and occupation than
a lawyer can with her entire brief-but I am focused not on the
problem of deciding whom to believe about "who did what to
whom" but rather on the problem of figuring out what to do with
such "facts" once we think we've "found" them.
Rule application decisions of the latter sort reveal a rich
pattern of recurring conflict, and it is my sense that two distinct
rhetorical operations contribute to that pattern. Thus, rule
application will frequently present lawyers with the opportunity to
argue one last time about the interpretation of the rule in question,
and the arguments and counterarguments they offer will often be
"nested" versions of the arguments and counterarguments
deployed in the selection or adoption of the rule itself. Rule
application will also frequently present lawyers with the
opportunity to argue about the characterization of the facts at
issue, and the arguments and counterarguments they offer will
often focus on the appropriate degree of fact sensitivity and thus
closely track the familiar debate over the relative merits of rules
vs. standards. We can visualize these operations by imagining
opposing lawyers attempting, on the one hand, to expand or shrink
the rule to include or exclude their case (rule interpretation) and,
on the other, to frame or counterframe the facts to take them
inside or outside the rule (fact characterization); in many cases, of
course, the lawyers will be undertaking both operations
simultaneously. My argument here is that as they make these
moves, two phenomena that have figured prominently in the legal
semiotics literature-the nesting of argument-pairs in a never-
ending contest of positions and the recurring debate about rules vs.
standards35-continue to exert their respective forces as we move
from the more familiar terrain of rule selection into the relatively
uncharted territory of rule application in a particular case. In
other words-and no doubt you saw this coming-it's conflict all
the way down.
Rule Application I: Rule Interpretation and Nested Conflict.
Let's begin with a concrete example drawn from Duncan's book, a
35 On "nesting," see CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 153, 175-77, 219. See generally
Kennedy, Semiotics, supra note 34; Jack Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669
(1990). Duncan's book touches briefly on the rules vs. standards debate as well, see
CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 151-52, but for more extended discussions, see Kennedy, Form
and Substance, supra note 2, and Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV.
379 (1985).
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tort case in which "A kills B in mistaken self-defense, when B was
really trying to assist him."36 The "nesting" phenomenon can be
seen when the debate shifts from the question of whether a
defense of "mistake" should be permitted at all to the question-
once a mistake defense is permitted in principle-of whether the
mistake must be "objectively -reasonable" or merely "in good
faith":
The plaintiff will say that the defense of mistake should not be
allowed: "as between two innocents, he who caused the damage
should pay"; we must protect the right of bodily security; we
need to deter carelessness; a rule of no defense will be easy to
administer. As to whether the defendant's conduct has to be
reasonable or merely in good faith, the plaintiff will make the
same arguments: an objective standard because "as between
two innocents," we must protect the right of bodily security, we
need to deter carelessness, an objective standard will be easy to
administer.... [And in response, the defendant will offer] the
exact same policy argument-bites that it endorsed when the
question was whether there should be a defense of mistake [in
the first place]: no liability without fault, the right of self-
defense, encourage self-help, solutions should be sensitive to
particular facts.37
We can see this same "nesting" phenomenon-where the
arguments deployed at one level of legal decision making
reemerge at the next level down-when we move from rule (or
subrule) selection to rule application, and this may be illustrated
by taking Duncan's mistaken self-defense hypothetical one step
further.
Assume that the defendant won the first round (mistake is a
defense) and that the plaintiff won the second (the mistake must
be objectively reasonable) and that the question now is whether
this particular defendant's particular mistake meets the "objective
reasonableness" test. That question will almost surely be viewed
by the lawyers as an invitation to resume their debate as they urge
broader vs. narrower readings of "objective reasonableness" in
order to exculpate the defendant (a reasonable person wouldn't
risk waiting until it was too late to exercise the right of self-
defense) or to inculpate him (a reasonable person would be careful
to distinguish friend from foe before inflicting bodily injury). At
the moment of application, then, the argument-"he who hesitates
is lost" vs. "look before you leap"-ends up right back where it
started.
36 CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 175.
37 Id. at 175-76.
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Or consider the debate in American contract law over
whether the offeror should be liable for the offeree's reliance on
an unaccepted offer-the debate made famous by the problem of
the general contractor who relies on a subcontractor's bid.38 On
the question of liability "in principle," the offeror is likely to argue
that courts shouldn't make contracts for the parties, that liability
should be promise based, and that a rule of "read my lips, no
liability" is easy to administer. The aggrieved offeree is in turn
likely to support liability by arguing that courts should protect
reasonable commercial expectations, that liability should be
reliance based, and that a more flexible approach is needed in
order to calibrate results to the particular commercial
circumstances. Once again, precisely the same debate will
reemerge if liability is established in principle but is made to turn
in an individual case on whether reliance should have been
"reasonably expected" by the offeror.39 Parallel to the "nesting"
we just saw in the context of mistaken self-defense, the parties will
find themselves redeploying their arguments as they urge a broad
reading ("the offeror should reasonably expect the offeree to rely
on the bid before accepting it because that is the commercial
norm") vs. a narrow reading ("the offeror should not reasonably
expect the offeree to rely unless he first protects himself with a
contract").
Similar examples abound-cases involving a determination of
"negligence" in the context of an injury-causing accident;
"coercion" in the context of a union organizing campaign;
''consent" in the context of an alleged rape-and when we apply
these standards to particular facts, and thus argue about how
broadly or narrowly to read them, we almost invariably find
ourselves revisiting the debates that led to their adoption in the
first place (no liability without fault vs. responsibility for the
consequences of your actions; employees as "free citizens" who
are capable of discounting overheated campaign rhetoric vs.
employees as economically dependent and thus vulnerable to even
subtle threats; the primacy of bodily security and decisional
autonomy vs. the right to rely on an "invitation" assertedly implicit
in the social setting).
Duncan refers to relatively open-ended concepts such as these
as "mixed questions of law and fact," and he concedes that their
38 Compare James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand,
J.) (against liability), with Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (Traynor,
J.) (for liability).
39 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1979) (basing liability on the
offeror's "reasonable expect[ation]" of reliance).
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application may involve "a matter of choice" and thus be "open to
ideological 'bias."' 40 But his effort to treat them as exceptional
cases in the world of rule application is unconvincing. Unless
there is something unusual about the regimes with which I am
most familiar-the National Labor Relations Act, the Uniform
Commercial Code, and the Restatements of Contracts and Torts-
there are an awful lot of legal rules out there the application of
which turns on precisely such questions.
More to the point, the burden of my argument is that the
ideological significance of this dimension of rule application is not
so much a function of the room to maneuver afforded by open-
ended standards as it is a consequence of the fact that as we move
from principle to particularity, the "nesting" phenomenon Duncan
has so astutely uncovered never seems to stop. Lawyers who have
pressed for different interpretations of "no vehicles allowed in the
park"-e.g., a plain-meaning approach that interprets "vehicles"
as "all vehicles" vs. a purposive one that interprets it as
"motorized vehicles"-can be expected to renew their debate
when they argue over how to apply the rule to the case of a
motorized wheelchair. Likewise, when a municipal ordinance
regulating restaurants requires two flush toilets "for every forty
seats," the debate over the meaning of "seats"-e.g., a lay
dictionary approach vs. a commercial context approach that
interprets it as "seats available for meal service"-can be expected
to continue when the rule is applied to an establishment with
stools at the bar or a bench at the take-out counter. And when the
Statute of Frauds requires a "signed writing," the debate over the
meaning of "writing"-e.g., an historical approach that requires
hardcopy vs. a commercial practices approach that focuses on how
businesses actually record their transactions-can be expected to
continue when the rule is applied to forms of electronic commerce
we cannot yet imagine.
Indeed, it may well be that the principal functional difference
between what we think of as a context-dependent standard and
what we think of as a bright-line rule lies in the fact that "plain
meaning" and "dictionary" arguments won't get you very far in a
debate over the application of (say) a "reasonableness" test,
whereas they might if we are trying to figure out what a "seat" or a
"writing" is. Does this make me a rule skeptic? Perhaps, though it
is a skepticism born of watching what lawyers and judges do with
rules (and teaching those techniques to my students) rather than of
any larger theoretical predisposition. Yet I do agree with Jeremy
40 CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 61.
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Paul that what lawyers and judges do with rules isn't all that
different from what regular folks do with language all the time."
When you ask me to shut the window, I may indeed shut the door
instead if the reason for your request is that you are feeling a draft,
and I decide that the door is the source of your discomfort. Have I
acted in accordance with your request? I'm not sure, but I bet
you'll thank me for it later.
In any event, my point here is a more modest one. Seemingly
defeated arguments live on to fight another day, even when the
"questions of law" are finally settled and the lawyers are left to the
mundane task of applying the resulting rule to the facts, for it's
nesting all the way down.
Rule Application II: Form and Substance in Factual
Characterization. Let's look one more time at Duncan's
description of "unselfconscious rule-following":
[T]he judge has facts before her and a single rule in mind. She
is focused on the question of what happened, and there are two
well-defined contradictory answers. If one version is what
"really" happened, then it seems obvious that defendant has
violated the relevant rule; if the other, then the defendant has
not violated the rule.42
It is frequently the case that this moment marks the beginning,
rather than the end, of conflict over the application of a rule.
Lawyers may offer competing accounts of the facts-designed to
take the case into or out of the rule-and the debate here is less
about what the facts "really" are than about how we should go
about reading them. And when lawyers engage in this debate they
will often draw on arguments that fall into familiar patterns.
Consider the following examples:
One at a time vs. taken-together. One side will take a series of
statements, communications, or events and measure them "one
at a time" against the applicable legal test (do we have an offer?
has the employer interfered with the union election?); read that
way, the individual statements etc. won't satisfy the test. The
other side will argue that the statements "taken together" do
indeed meet the test.
Words vs. actions. One side will focus on what the parties have
said or written (the letter described the promised donation as a
"gift"); the other side will focus on their actions or course of
conduct (but when she made part payment she was obviously
seeking a return commitment and thus proposing a bargain).
41 See Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915 (1988).
42 CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 160.
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Written vs. oral expressions. One side will focus on the "paper
trail" (e.g., the personnel manual with the carefully crafted
notice that all employees are "at will"); the other side will focus
on conversations and oral statements (e.g., repeated assurances
by the supervisor that your job is secure).
Literalism vs. reasonable expectations. One side will focus on
the "fine print" (e.g., the details of an "add-on" clause or an
idiosyncratic definition of a "break-in" covered by an insurance
policy); the other side will focus on the reasonable
understandings of the parties based on the purpose of the
transaction, assurances contained in advertisements, statements
by sales agents, lay or common sense understandings, etc.
Competing meanings. One side will use (say) a lay dictionary
definition to support its claim (the offer said mason jars, and the
response was not an acceptance under the mirror image rule
because it stipulated that the mason jars had to be "first
quality"); the other side will invoke commercial understandings
(those engaged in the mason jar trade would reasonably
understand that the two expressions mean the same thing).
Competing time frames. One side will focus on the immediate
events (e.g., the seemingly minor provocation prompting a
deadly act of self-defense); the other side will expand the focus
to include past events that put matters in a different light (when
the act characterized as a seemingly minor provocation
occurred in the past, it quickly escalated into life-threatening
behavior).
Competing levels of generality. One side will portray the facts at
a high level of generality in order to fit them into a desired rule
(he didn't read the contract before signing it); the other side will
fill in the details to call the application of the rule into question
(the other party asked him to sign as he was rushing out the
door to his daughter's wedding and didn't speak up when it
became clear that the signing party was under a mistaken
impression about the contents of the document).
Competing points of view. The same statement ("in our current
financial state, we can't afford the union pay scale") may be
portrayed as a simple statement of fact from the point of view
of the employer and as an ominous threat from the point of
view of the employee; the same act (making sketches from
which to paint a family portrait) may be portrayed as the
"beginning of performance" by an artist ("sketchwork is an
essential part of portraiture") and as "mere preparations" by
her customer ("I am paying for a portrait, not a sketch"); etc.43
43 Jeremy Paul and I outline these conflicts-and offer more extended illustrations-in
FISCHL & PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE, supra note 34, at 75-85.
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Sometimes substantive law "takes sides" in these debates, but
when that happens the underlying conflict will nevertheless
frequently persist and simply move to a new battlefield. The
debate between "one at a time" and "taken together" may, for
example, seem to be resolved in favor of the latter if an "all the
circumstances" test is adopted, but we shouldn't be surprised if
"nesting" occurs and the parties renew their debate when the legal
standard is applied to a particular case (totality = the sum of the
statements vs. totality = a "whole" that is "greater than the sum of
the parts"). Likewise, substantive law may privilege one of the
"points of view"-in labor law, for example, the presence or
absence of unlawful coercion in employer statements is evaluated
from the point of view of what employees would "reasonably
understand"-but the vanquished viewpoint may reemerge from
the nest when we apply the test and (to continue the example)
argue about just what is "reasonable" for the employee to
"understand."
Conflict may continue even in cases where the substantive law
is designed to eliminate factual dispute altogether. This is a
phenomenon that is closely related to "nesting"-I think of it as
"argument flight"-where the supposedly eliminated conflict
simply migrates to a more favorable climate. If acceptance is
invariably effective upon dispatch, we shouldn't be surprised to
find a great deal of factual dispute about what constitutes an
acceptance. If speech is free, we shouldn't be surprised to find a
lot of litigation about what constitutes speech. And if the National
Labor Relations Board decides not to regulate campaign
misrepresentations by employers and unions-but continues to
prohibit threats-we shouldn't be surprised to find an increasing
number of election challenges based on threats.
This is not to suggest that legal rules don't matter. There will
no doubt be acceptances, speech, misrepresentations, etc. that
cannot even plausibly be recharacterized, and while sometimes this
will mean that the dispute will simply migrate elsewhere (maybe
the earlier communication Wasn't an offer? maybe there is a
compelling state interest for restricting the speech?), there may at
other times be no way out. Taking the possibility of closure
seriously-and locating it in the experience of constructing legal
arguments-is one of Duncan's most valuable contributions to this
debate.
Yet I do think he's overstated the frequency of closure, and I
don't think it's because he's a closet formalist. Duncan is rightly
anxious to respond to the legal sociologists who have criticized the
cls focus on appellate adjudication: "If it makes no difference
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(beyond the dispute in question) what law [judges] make or how
they explain it, then there are no interesting ideological stakes in
the rules, and there is no possibility of legitimation through legal
discourse."44  But it seems to me that he won this fight by
demonstrating that judicial lawmaking is as much a fact of legal life
as legislative and administrative lawmaking. That ideological
conflict doesn't stop once "law" is "made" is an affliction common
to lawmaking in every forum.
So is there a politics to the recurring patterns of factual
argument? I think so, but it's more difficult to discern than the
politics of doctrine and policy explored so thoroughly in Duncan's
book. For one thing, it is often the case that judges and lawyers
offer competing factual characterizations without actually
defending them. Each side acts as if it has simply provided an
account of "what 'really' happened" and as if the other side is just
plain wrong. In the famous Allegheny College case,"5 for example,
Cardozo's majority opinion doesn't criticize the Kellogg dissent for
failing to look beyond the four corners of Mrs. Johnston's written
pledge, nor does Kellogg criticize Cardozo for his willingness to
look to subsequent party conduct to resolve the dispute. Like
lawyers and judges in many cases, they each offer their carefully
crafted narratives in the style of Joe "Just the Facts, Ma'am"
Friday and do not engage in a debate about why we ought to view
the facts one way or the other. To be sure, this happens with some
frequency in debates about "law" as well, but my undocumented
(if not uneducated) impression is that it is a more common
occurrence in the context of disagreements about facts.
A possible reason for this is that factual argument tends to slip
through the cracks of American legal education, undertheorized in
most clinical courses and missing in action altogether in the
traditional Socratic classroom. (Indeed, "wrong on the facts" was
the only factual argument anyone ever taught us when I was in law
school.) With some important exceptions,46 we've scarcely begun
to study or teach the structure of factual analysis with the same
energy and rigor that we devote to law and policy, and as a result
the lawyers and judges we help train may in fact be far less self-
44 Id. at 268.
45 Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
46 See, e.g., TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE:
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF
(1991).
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conscious about how they do things with facts than they are about
how they do things with law.
But as we have seen there are recurring rhetorical patterns in
the practice of factual characterization, and there is, I think, a
politics here as well. Perhaps the most common pattern of factual
dispute is what I have described as "competing points of view,"
where a statement or an event is characterized differently by (say)
the employer vs. the employee or the landlord vs. the tenant.
What we have here is simply one more instance of nesting, where
the conflict at stake in the selection and interpretation of the rule
at issue (e.g., a prohibition against antiunion threats by employers)
reemerges at the moment of rule application, and here the parties
are proxies for partisans in the larger conflict.
The rest of the patterns seem to me to share a common
thread. They reflect a profound cultural ambivalence about the
appropriate role of fact sensitivity and context-how much is
enough and how much is too much-in authoritative decision
making, and in this respect the debate can be understood as a
nested version of our endless debates about rules and standards.
Like the arguments for rules, the arguments for "taking things one
at a time"-or for narrowing our focus to the four corners of the
document; or for genuflecting at the altar of fine print; or for
limiting consideration to the events immediately preceding an act
of supposed self-defense; or for insisting on dictionary rather than
social meanings; or for viewing events abstractly rather than
concretely-are arguments that reveal a mistrust of authoritative
decision making (and decision makers!); a desire to avoid
judgment calls; a need for closure (enough already!); and a belief
that it is possible, and indeed desirable, to let rules do the deciding
for us. And like the arguments for standards, the arguments for
"taking things together"-or for broadening our focus to the larger
course of conduct; or for attempting to divine reasonable
expectations; or for preferring a movie to a snapshot and detail to
abstraction-are arguments that reveal a willingness to trust
ourselves, each other, and judges. Like the arguments pitting rules
against standards, then, there is a deeper connection to competing
"organicist" and "atomist" social visions-complicated, to be sure,
by the fact that the arguments in question are with some frequency
instrumentalized for deployment by "the other side"-but, as
Duncan has argued,47 a connection nonetheless.
47 See CRITIQUE, supra note 7, at 151-52.
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Have I overstated the case for ambiguity in adjudication?
Maybe; but then again, maybe not. I worried a lot about that
question when Jeremy Paul and I finished work on a book
designed to make law students more comfortable with all the
ambiguity they encounter in their legal education generally and on
law school exams in particular.48 What concerned me the most as
we awaited the reactions of readers was that in our effort to
provide dozens upon dozens of concrete illustrations from multiple
areas of the law, we would get one or more of our examples
"wrong"-that what we had offered as an instance of ambiguity
was really a "well-settled" case that anyone well-versed in the field
would immediately recognize as a question with but a single
answer, perhaps suggesting that an ideological commitment to
ambiguity had overcome our professional commitment to craft.
The nightmare nearly came true when within a short period of
time we each received calls from readers anxious to let us know
that there was a serious problem with a hypothetical-a variation
on that old Contracts chestnut, the "flagpole" or "Brooklyn
Bridge" case-that plays a major role in the book. 9 Jeremy heard
from a prominent lawyer who had taken first-year Contracts from
no less than Karl Llewellyn, and I heard from my own law school
Contracts professor, no slouch. And sure enough they were both
bearing the bad news that the hypo we were using could only come
out one way. Much to our relief and then amusement, though,
they each were absolutely certain that it would come out a
different way.
My criticisms are obviously quite sympathetic with the larger
intellectual and political project that Duncan began a quarter
century ago and has reenergized with this remarkable book.
Indeed, it is precisely because I find his account of freedom and
constraint in adjudication so compelling that I want to take it
beyond the debates between liberalism and conservatism, and it is
48 See FISCHL & PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE, supra note 34.
49 See id. at 22-24, 133-41. The hypothetical involves an offer by "Patron" to pay
"Artiste" $10,000 to paint a family portrait and an attempt by Patron to revoke the offer
after Artiste has begun sketchwork, but before she had actually begun the portrait. The
point of the hypothetical is to demonstrate ambiguities with respect both to the law (the
common-law rule permits revocation prior to complete performance, and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts prohibits revocation once performance has begun) and to the facts
(the sketchwork could be characterized either as the beginning of performance or as
"mere preparations").
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precisely because I find his semiotic work so compelling that I
want to take it "all the way down." There is, of course, no small
irony in arguing that there is simultaneously more constraint
("tilt") and more "indeterminacy" than Duncan's account of
adjudication acknowledges, but I can think of no better starting
point for the work still to be done than A Critique of Adjudication.
It seems to me that we should be grateful for this much and wish
the enterprise what success is possible short of the overcoming of
its contradictions.
